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INTRODUCTION
"Whoever speaks of dispute settlement in GATT must start from
nearly nothing."' It is true enough that after the International Trade
Organization, with a comprehensive chapter on dispute settlement,
was voted into an early grave by the United States Congress, the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT") was left as a
multilateral treaty, provisionally applied with no veritable organiza-
* Lic. lur., Brussels, 1994; PG.Dip. (Hons), Bristol, 1995; Ph.D. candidate,
University Assistant at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels. The author would like to
thank Stefaan Smis for his remarks and Professor Dr. E. Franckx for his patience.
Comments are welcome via e-mail at Kim.Van.der.Borght'vub.ac.be.
1. Pierre Pescatore, The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Its Present
Situation and its Prospects, 10 J. INT'L ARB. 27, 27 (1993).
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tional structure and only two Articles on dispute settlement.2 From
these two Articles, Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT, a system
for the settlement of disputes developed incrementally through a mix
of creativity and necessity.' The most fundamental change occurred
during the Uruguay Round, which spawned the rules of the new dis-
pute settlement mechanism ("DSM") found in the Understanding on
Dispute Settlement ("DSU").4 The DSU changed the nature of the
dispute settlement process from a diplomatic to a legalized process
and from a power-based to a rule-based procedure With the new
World Trade Organization ("WTO"), the DSM introduced a series of
features to deal with the problems of the past. There is now a "right
to a panel," and reports are adopted "as of right" unless there is a
consensus in the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") to the contrary-
the so-called negative or inverted consensus rule. Further, the DSB
introduced strict deadlines to settle disputes within a time-frame ac-
ceptable to the business community. Finally, a standing Appellate
2. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT
163-192 (1969) (surveying and analyzing Articles XXII and XXIII); Paul Demaret,
The Metamorphoses of GA 77. From the Havana Charter to the World Trade Or-
ganization, 34 COLUMBIA J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 125-33 (1995) (discussing the
evolution of the GATT from 1947 to its present structure).
3. See William R. Sprance, The World Trade Organization and United States'
Sovereignty: The Political and Procedural Realities of the System, 13 AM. U.
INT'L L. REv. 1225, 1236-38 (1998) (describing the deficiencies in clarity of the
early GATT dispute settlement system, which led to the modification of Articles
XXII and XXIII).
4. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, Annex 2, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 353; 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
DSU].
5. See generally Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Under-
standing: Less is More, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 416, 416-18 (1996) (discussing the con-
cessional and non-binding nature of panel decisions); Judith H. Bello & Alan F.
Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 24: Dispute Resohtion in the New
World Trade Organization: Concerns and Net Benefits, 28 INT'L L. 1095, 1096-03
(1994) (relating the United States' involvement in changing the dispute settlement
process and its current concerns regarding this new framework); J.G. Castel, The
Uruguay Round and the Improvements to the GA TT Dispute Settlement Rules and
Procedures, 38 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 834, 834-49 (1989); Thomas Dillon Jr., The
World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for World Trade?, 16 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 349 (1995) (discussing the evolution of the WTO and its dispute settle-
ment mechanism).
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Body presides to ensure the legal consistency of the reports and of
the jurisprudence in general.
In short, the DSU created a legalized, predictable, and reliable
system for settling disputes. This system is now under review, pursu-
ant to a decision of the WTO Members in 1994.' This decision in-
vites "the Ministerial Conference to complete a full review of dispute
settlement rules and procedures under the World Trade Organization
within four years... and to take a decision... whether to continue,
modify or terminate such dispute settlement rules and procedures."'
The Review was scheduled for completion in 1998, but as a result of
the numerous proposals submitted, the deadline for the review was
extended until the end of July 1999.'
I. IS EVERYBODY HAPPY?
If there is one point of agreement among the WTO Members who
have utilized the dispute settlement procedure, it is their general sat-
isfaction with the system, which they do not hesitate to express in
their submissions for the review. They praise its role in strengthening
the credibility and predictability of the multilateral trading system,
the impartial and objective manner in which disputes are settled, and
the positive and satisfactory solutions found. As a consequence, the
proposals stress that there is no need for a major overhaul of the
system. Instead, they address inadequacies and technical issues,
clarifying provisions, fine-tuning, and enhancing the efficacy of the
system. Major issues for these WTO Members include the strength-
ening of the consultation phase, eradicating the problems involved
with the establishment of a panel, and clarifying the Appellate
Body's position. Some adjustments to the time limits also are dis-
cussed generally. Finally, many WTO Members in this group stress
6. See Decision on the Application and Review of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 l.L.M.
1125, 1259, reprinted in JOHN H. JACKSON, 1995 DOCUMENTs SUPPLBENT TO
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 446 (3d ed. 1995).
7. Id. at 1260.
8. See International Communique on Trade and Sustainable Development,
Decision of the General Council of 8 Dec. 1998, 2 BRIDGES, Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 9,
9 (visited Mar. 23, 1999) <http://www.ictsd.org> (noting the surprising amount of
proposals submitted, which made an extension until the end of July 1999 neces-
sary).
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the importance of public participation and transparency of the system
in order to enhance "public understanding of the benefits of the mul-
tilateral trading system in order to build support for it and agree to
work towards that end."9
However, to conclude that there is a general satisfaction among all
WTO Members that the dispute settlement is working well and is fair
for all WTO Members would be a mistake. While developed coun-
tries can take an active part in the dispute settlement process, the
majority of WTO Members are developing countries that in many
cases have neither the financial means nor the expertise to effectively
protect their rights under the covered agreements. Even if a favorable
report is adopted, the developing nations have no effective way of
enforcing its recommendations, as retaliation is likely to hurt them
more than a prospectively targeted developed country. Therefore, on
the wish-list of the developing countries are better funding for the le-
gal assistance, access to a defense counsel, and certainly an enforce-
ment mechanism that is equally effective for developing countries.
Numerous non-government organizations ("NGOs") are also un-
satisfied with the current system. These organizations do not have di-
rect access to the dispute settlement process. Nevertheless, the causes
for which they fight-such as the environment, labor standards, eco-
nomic development, and consumer rights-are as important as the
free trade principles that form the basis of the WTO. As it stands,
one should not expect the WTO to be able to forcibly defend these
causes under the current agreements. The WTO agreements are es-
sentially free trade agreements. The conclusion of some critics that,
"the dispute settlement rules subordinate or diminish non-trade-
policy objectives,"' only reveals a truism that is a result of the state
of affairs of the current rules. The solution is not a frontal attack on
the WTO, but the creation of relevant rules by states and interna-
tional organizations. In the words of WTO's Director-General Re-
nato Ruggiero:
9. WTO Secretariat, May 1998 Ministerial Conference, 52"d Session, WTO
Doc. WT/MIN(98)DEC/1 (May 20, 1998).
10. Bello, supra note 6, at 416; see also Constance Kann, Review of the WTO
Dispute Settlement System-A Sneak Preview?, 4 INT'L TRADE & REG., Aug. 1998,
at 152.
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In all this we must also be clear that every global issue should have its
own solution. Environmental and social problems need environmental and
social answers-and seeking solutions through trade rules is not a substi-
tute. And those solutions should be multilaterally agreed in the proper fo-
rum-in coordination with trade rules-so that different policies can re-
flect common values and be mutually supportive. The reality is that many
of the existing problems the WTO system faces with environmental and
other objectives do not lie in differences of values or of priorities, but in
the lack of multilateral rules in these areas-which in turn calls for an im-
possible blessing of unilateral and extraterritorial rules."
NGOs, especially environmental NGOs, have mounted a well-
organized campaign to gain better access to the WTO and the DSM
in particular. Their actions have been successful in several respects:
first, they have increased public awareness; second, they were in-
vited by the United States to submit their views on the DSU Review,
and; third, they succeeded in convincing the Appellate Body to ac-
cept the concept of amicus curiae briefs.' 2 For the Review, the NGOs
are looking for greater transparency in the form of open hearings,
and earlier removal of restrictions on parties' submissions-or a
public summary thereof. To ensure the future of anicus curiae briefs
in the DSM, they must become a formal procedural element in the
DSU.
II. THE REVIEW PROPOSALS
A. TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
The main request from NGOs is greater transparency of the DSM
to give more information to NGOs and civil society. The aim is two-
fold: first, they wish to provide NGOs with more information sooner
so they can participate usefully, both directly and indirectly, in the
11. Renato Ruggiero, The Next 50 Years: Challenges and Opportunites fr the
Multilateral Trading System (last modified June 11, 1998) <http:lvwww.wVto.org
wto/speechesfhaamburg.htm>.
12. See Report of the Appellate Body on United States-Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Oct. 12, 1998, WTO Doc. WTiDS58!ABfR,
para. 110 [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle] ("We find, and so hold, that the Panel erred
in its legal interpretation that accepting non-requested information from non-
governmental sources from non-governmental sources is incompatible with the
provisions of the DSU.").
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defense of the causes for which they stand, and, second, they want to
heighten public awareness to increase the legitimacy of the system."
Important WTO Members, such as the United States and the Euro-
pean Communities, support such changes.
In furtherance of these goals, three issues emerge: the removal of
restrictions on documents, the mandatory review of amicus curiae
briefs, and the conversion to open hearings. The United States and
the European Communities propose all three. Many WTO Members
have serious reservations about greater transparency, however, be-
cause they fear that it would harm the intergovernmental character of
the WTO, and would diminish the control of the parties over the dis-
pute settlement process. Dispute settlement is still regarded by many
WTO Members as an arbitral system, despite the fact that it is highly
judicialized1 4 They fear that the interests of some pressure groups
will gain more importance to the detriment of the system as a
whole.'5 Some apprehension also exists as to the protection of busi-
ness or commercial secrets.
Article 18.2 of the DSU states that submissions of the parties to
panels or Appellate Body proceedings are confidential, but that they
can decide to make their submissions public.'" In case the submis-
sions remain confidential, the same Article provides for the possibil-
ity of making public summaries. This possibility, however, has re-
mained largely unused. It is suggested that secrecy restrictions in
parties' submissions should be removed as soon as possible, or at
least from the non-confidential parts thereof. Moreover, a strict
deadline is suggested for the public summary of confidential submis-
sions. This demand for more information sooner is not limited to the
DSM, but is part of a larger debate in the WTO, in order to involve
civil society in the WTO's work as public hostility towards this or-
13. See John H. Jackson, Due Process in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body,
Address at the 2 d Annual Conference of the World Trade Law Association: Liber-
alisation and Protectionism in the World Trading System (May 15, 1998).
14 See, e.g., Debra Steger, Overview of WTO Dispute Settlement, Address at
the 2 d Annual Conference of the World Trade Law Association: Liberalisation and
Protectionism in the World Trading System (May 15, 1998).
15. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Misguided Debate over NGO Particpation at
the WTO, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 433, 433-57 (1998).
16. See DSU, supra note 4, art. 18.2.
1228 [14:1223
THE REVIEW OF THE WTO DSU
ganization grows. Many see the WTO as protecting economic glob-
alization without regard for social, cultural, or environmental con-
cerns of domestic policies. For similar reasons, open hearings would
serve to increase the public's trust in the system, and take away any
unfounded suspicions of involvement in a cover-up or a conspiracy
that a non-transparent process fosters.
The Appellate Body in the United States-Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products ("Shrimp-Turtle") report opens
the door for amicus curiae briefs by interpreting the right to seek in-
formation 7 through a discretionary authority, to request information
or expert advice, and to consider both requested and non-requested
information.'8 Some WTO Members are opposed to amicus curiae
briefs and strive to block this evolution by interpreting the right "to
seek" information more as a right "to request" information, thus ex-
cluding unsolicited views. 9 This interpretation is in accordance with
the view that the DSM is an essentially arbitral procedure controlled
by the parties.2 0 Others look more favorably on amicus curiae briefs
as a way to enrich the panel and the Appellate Body proceedings.
Furthermore, they reject the argument that the panel or Appellate
Body would be deluged and the procedure consequently delayed be-
cause the panel or Appellate Body still would decide whether or not
to entertain the amnicus curiae briefs. Moreover, they would not be
bound to reply to the arguments contained therein.
B. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Developing countries in the GATT have fought for special rules and
more favorable treatment, which they have received gradually since
17. See DSU, supra note 4, art. 13.
18. See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 12, paras. 79-91 (analyzing the admissibility
of three amicus briefs attached to the United States' submissions to the Panel and
concluding that if the United States agreed with the arguments presented in these
briefs then they were properly submitted).
19. See THE SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORIC PRINCIPLES
(1970) (defining the verb to seek as "to go in search or quest of; to try to find,"
suggesting some form of action on the part of the panel or Appellate Body which is
more in line with treaty interpretation).
20. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (noting that WTO members still
view the dispute settlement process as arbitral in nature despite its judicial-like
procedures).
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the Tokyo Round.2  Under the current dispute settlement system a
number of special rules exist for developing countries:
2
* legal assistance ,23
" guaranteed one developing country panelist (on request), 24
• good offices of the Director-General, 25 and
" allowances as to time limits.
26
Undoubtedly the most important change for the developing coun-
tries has been the metamorphosis of the GATT system into the WTO
system of settling disputes. The current DSM is relied upon by sev-
eral developing countries to enforce their legal rights under the cur-
rent agreement. Contrary to the GATT system, the WTO DSM is a
rule-based system that guarantees that a decision does not depend on
the economic strength of the parties concerned, but on the merit of
the claims. To advocate a claim effectively, however, expertise is
needed in both substantive WTO law and in the procedural aspects of
the DSM, something that is often lacking when developing countries
are bringing a case or defending themselves before a panel. Whereas
the DSU provides for assistance from the Secretariat on legal, his-
torical, and procedural aspects,27 as well as additional legal advice
21. See generally ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT
LEGAL SYSTEM (1987); Kofi Oteng Kufour, From the GATT to the WTO-The De-
veloping Countries and the Reform of the Procedures for the Settlement of Inter-
national Trade Disputes, 31 J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1997, at 117.
22. See Asif H. Qureshi, The New International Trade Dispute Settlement
Framework under the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 5 INT'L COMPANY &
COMM. L. REV. 204-05 (1994); Palitha T. B. Kohona, Dispute Settlement under the
World Trade Organisation-An Overview, 28 J. WORLD. TRADE, Apr. 1994, at 22,
31-33 (1994); Fadi A. Makki, African Countries and the WTO Dispute Settlement
Mechanism, Address at the Eighth Annual Conference of the African Society of
International and Comparative Law 43-47 (Sept. 2-4, 1996); ERNST-ULRICH
PETERSMANN, The GATTiWTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL
LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 202-04 (1997);
Maria Martha Ching, Evaluating the Effectiveness of the GATT Dispute Settlement
System for Developing Countries, 16 WORLD COMPETITION 105-11 (1993).
23. See DSU, supra note 4, art. 27.2.
24. See id. art. 8.
25. See id. arts. 3.10, 24.2.
26. See id. arts. 3.10, 12.2.
27. See id. art. 27.1.
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and assistance provided when developing countries are involved, :'
this has been insufficient in practice. Consequently, the foremost re-
quest from developing countries is additional support to allow them
to defend their claims effectively.
The minimum request seems to be an augmentation of the staff
provided for in Article 27.2 of the DSU,29 currently consisting of two
part-time consultants. Reportedly, Venezuela has the most far-
reaching proposal with five consultants in an independent legal unit.
Such a unit would ensure that developing countries receive inde-
pendent advice on every aspect of the procedure without prejudice to
the neutrality of the Secretariat."0 Furthermore, it is suggested that a
Permanent Defense Counsel be established to assist developing
countries whenever cases are brought against them. Many countries
have suggested that WTO budget surpluses be used to create a re-
serve fund to finance this Counsel."
As general as the perceived lack of sufficient legal assistance is
the fear for the large costs that result from the advice of law firms lo-
cated in developed countries. This advice is needed by developing
countries because of the lack of in-house expertise and the afore-
mentioned inadequacies of the assistance offered under Article 27 of
the DSU12 Considerable expenditure also will be incurred as a con-
sequence of having to collect technical, economic, scientific, and
other data to support a claim. To help developing countries cover
these costs, it is proposed to establish a trust fund to help finance the
28. See DSU, supra note 4, art. 27.2.
29. See id.
30. Some suspicion could be raised about a Secretariat that assists both the
panels and one of the parties to the dispute. The maxim, "Justice need not only be
done, it must also be seen to be done," stresses the importance of appearances.
Therefore, the strict separation of both roles of the Secretariat should be made
clearer. This could be done by setting up a separate legal advice division, as sug-
gested in some Review proposals, directly responsible to the DSB or the Director-
General. It could alternatively be achieved by the creation of so-called "Chinese
walls," which are used in banking to separate divisions of the same department
between which no sharing of information or ideas are to occur.
31. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing a fund created by the
United Nations).
32. See BHAGIRATH LAL DAS, THE WTO AGREEMENrrs: DEFICIENCIES,
IMBALANCES AND REQUIRED CHANGES 9-12 (1998).
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costs of retaining external experts-such as lawyers and consultants.
If implemented, this WTO Counsel would be similar to the Trust
Fund managed by the United Nations Secretary-General and fi-
nanced by voluntary contributions of various states. The United Na-
tions Trust Fund was established to help developing countries meet
the costs of litigation in the International Court of Justice.3
Finally, developing countries face the problem of enforcing the
findings of the adopted reports. The threat of retaliation is not an ef-
fective tool for these WTO Members. Whereas the DSM is a rule-
based system, enforcement is only effective for those WTO Members
with sufficient economic power. This problem is not new and neither
are the proposed solutions.3 4 Once again, monetary damages are sug-
gested as well joint or collective retaliation."
C. CONSULTATIONS
In public international law, consultations are a form of negotiation
that appears as a means of settling disputes. 6 Consultations are
sometimes provided in treaties as the sole means of settling disputes.
In other cases, they prescribe the first stage in a more comprehensive
dispute settlement system. If the parties in the consultation fail to
reach a solution, they can proceed to a form of third-party dispute
settlement.37 Consultations are generally regarded as an effective and
flexible means of settling disputes. 8 Most international conflicts are
settled through a form of negotiation whereby the parties hold direct
discussions in order to find a solution acceptable to all the parties in-
volved.3 9
33. See, e.g., Peter H. F. Bekker, International Legal Aid in Practice: The ICJ
Trust Fund, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 659, 660-65 (describing the establishment, purpose
and criteria for eligibility of the Fund).
34. See GATT, BISD 14 Supp. 18, at 139-40 (1966); ROBERT E. HUDEC,
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT
LEGAL SYSTEM 42 (1993).
35. See, e.g., DAS, supra note 32, at 11-14, 18-2 1.
36. See UNITED NATIONS, HANDBOOK ON THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES 10 (1992) (OLA/COD/2394).
37. See id.
38. See id. at 9.
39. See DSU, supra note 5, art. 11 (stating that WTO panels should give the
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According to the DSU, WTO Members are under a legal obliga-
tion to enter into consultations as a first step in the WTO dispute set-
tlement process.40 The complaining party may request the establish-
ment of a panel, only if these consultations fail to settle the dispute
within sixty days after the date of receipt of the request."' It is clear,
however, that the DSU prefers a negotiated "solution mutually ac-
ceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered
agreements ' 42 to an outcome through panel proceedings."'
The effectiveness of these consultations depends solely on the
parties' willingness "to engage in these procedures in good faith in
an effort to resolve the dispute" as required by the general provisions
section of the DSU.4 WTO Members expressly affirmed their re-
solve to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of the consultation
procedures in the DSU.4 1 Practice shows, however, that not all WTO
Members appear to attach the same importance to this commitment.
They abuse the flexibility inherent in the system to avoid real con-
sultations. A textual interpretation of the DSU puts no clear obliga-
tions on the complainant in this respect. It suffices for the complain-
ing party to submit a request for consultations and possibly hold an
initial meeting.4 The only remaining requirement to request the es-
tablishment of a panel is to wait the expiry of the sixty-day period."'
Such attitude, however, reduces the consultation phase to a mere
parties adequate opportunity to find a mutually acceptable solution).
40. See id. art. 4.1.
41. See id. art. 4.7.
42. Id. art. 3.7.
43. See id. art. 4.5 ("In the course of consultations in accordance with the pro-
visions of a covered agreement, before resorting to further action under this Under-
standing, Members should attempt to obtain satisfactory adjustment of the mat-
ter."). This "further action," however, is no longer regarded as the hostile act it
once was. See id.
44. Id. art. 3.10.
45. DSU, supra note 5, art. 4.1.
46. See id. art. 4.7. Although there is no specific sanction if the complaining
party refuses to hold an initial meeting. It would of course be contrary to the gen-
eral principles governing the DSU and volatile of its good faith obligations. If the
defendant refuses conversely, the complainant can proceed directly to request the
establishment of a panel. See id. art. 4.3.
47. See id. art. 4.7.
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formality, which is a hurdle in the way of panel proceedings and is,
at best, a cooling-off period.
How this evolution could be halted and how substantial debate
could be encouraged in the consultation phase is a concern expressed
in a number of submissions. The adjustment proposed involves in-
creasing the obligations and thus limiting the flexibility because the
existing obligations are seen as insufficient to bring parties to real
consultations. Let us briefly look at the existing legal obligations of
the parties under the DSU. Even though there is no obligation to
reach a result,48 the DSU does hold an obligation to employ best ef-
forts to reach a mutually satisfactory solution. 9 Moreover, Members
are required to respect certain principles in an obligation to negotiate
solutions to their disputes, such as the consultations in the DSU.
They include: "good faith as properly understood; sustained upkeep
of the negotiations over a period appropriate to the circumstances;
awareness of the other party's interest; and a persevering quest for an
acceptable compromise."5"
If one of the parties was unwilling to hold consultations, this
would violate both its best efforts obligation and the aforementioned
principles. Furthermore, if a party adopts a negotiating position
"without contemplating any modification of it,"'" this would violate
Articles 4.1 and 4.2 of the DSU because they do not take into ac-
count the views and opinions of the other party.5 2 It also would vio-
48. See SIR ROBERT JENNINGS & SIR ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1182 (1997); BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS
APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 117-18 (1987) (discussing
that only good faith and the "sincere and honest desire as evidenced by a genuine
effort" are required to fulfill a legal agreement).
49. See DSU, supra note 5, art. 4.5 ("In the course of consultations in accor-
dance with the provisions of a covered agreement, before resorting to former ac-
tion under this Understanding, Members should attempt to obtain satisfactory ad-
justment of the matter.").
50. Kuwait v. American Indep. Oil Co., 21 I.L.M. 976, 1014 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1982).
51. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 4,
47 (Feb. 20).
52. See DSU, supra note 4, arts. 4.1-4.2. Article 4.2 of the DSU requires
"[e]ach Member to... afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding any
representations made by another Member concerning measures affecting the op-
eration of any covered agreement taken within the territory of the former." Id. art.
1234 [14:1223
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late Article 4.5 because they make no attempt to obtain a settle-
ment. 3 Moreover, this position would not be in accordance with the
overall aims of the dispute settlement procedure."
Using the consultation phase as a mere formality constitutes an
evasion of a treaty obligation and is, as such, an abuse of right." The
consultation phase as it stands is largely unregulated and thus leaves
considerable discretion to the parties.56 This discretion, however, is
not unlimited. It must be used in conformity with the general spirit of
the treaty. 7 Any other use has to be qualified as an abuse of discre-
tion.
In sum, the whole system of consultations depends essentially on
the goodwill of the parties. The obligations are vague and rely heav-
ily on good faith. Therefore, the enforcement is subsequently diffi-
cult. In the words of Professor Bin Cheng:
unless this discretion is normally exercised by every subject of law spon-
taneously in a bona fide manner well within the limit beyond which the
exercise may be regarded as an abuse, even if the law is able ultimately to
prevent certain manifest abuses, the legal system will be strained to
breaking point.5
The review proposals acknowledge the problem by introducing
specific obligations that are aimed at making it possible to review the
4.2.
53. See DSU, supra note 4, art. 4.5 (encouraging WTO Members to "obtain
satisfactory adjustment of the matter").
54. See DSU, supra note 5, art. 3.7 (setting forth the aim of the dispute settle-
ment mechanism as to "secure a positive solution," which is "mutually acceptable
to the parties").
55. See CHENG, supra note 48, at 123 (commenting that "any fictious exercise
of a right for purpose of evading either a rule of law or a contractual obligation will
not be tolerated").
56. See generally, DSU, supra note 4, art. 4 (setting forth the terms of the con-
sultation phase).
57. See id. art. 3.3 (calling for the prompt settlements of disputes and the
proper balance between the rights and obligations of members); id. art. 3.7 (de-
scribing the aim of the dispute settlement mechanism as securing a positive solu-
tion to a dispute whereby it is mutually acceptable to the parties but also consistent
with covered agreements).
58. CHENG, supra note 48, at 136.
1999] 1235
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
consultations by the panel. For example, it recommends an obliga-
tion of holding at least two meetings. More common are require-
ments of written evidence, starting with the request for consultations.
Article 4.4 of the DSU requires that the request is in writing and
gives reasons including identification of the legal basis of the com-
plaint. An indication of the legal basis would no longer suffice." The
complainant's case should be stated adequately and unambiguously.
The European Communities go even further by proposing that any
legal claim in the request for the establishment of a panel should be
included in the request for consultations, or raised during the con-
sultations, confirmed in writing, and followed by new consultations
unless the defending party agrees otherwise.6" These proposals set the
trend for a formalization of the procedure whereby the efforts of the
parties have to be evidenced in writing. Additional suggestions in-
clude written questions and answers, and the introduction of an
agreed written records of the consultations. These documents should
give a subsequent panel the possibility of investigating in a prelimi-
nary phase whether there has been an attempt to obtain a satisfactory
adjustment of the matter in good faith. The following sanctions are
proposed if a party's written submissions are found lacking: extra
consultations for claims that have not been the subject of previous
consultations; if a party refuses to reply to a written question, the
other party could be given direct access to a panel; if an answer is
found to be inadequate, the panel can request further information,
and in case this is not provided proceed on "the best information
available," possibly the information in the complaint."
All these measures are aimed at strengthening the role of the con-
sultations and forcing the parties to go through the motions of the
consultative phase. The proposed measures may inspire serious criti-
cism as to their effectiveness. For example, these proposed rules will
increase the formality of the consultation process, which is by defi-
59. See DSU, supra note 4, art. 4.4.
60. See European Communities, Discussion Paper on the Review of the Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding (DSU) [hereinafter EC Discussion Paper] (on file
with American University International Law Review).
61. See id. (discussing how some of these sanctions are reportedly also pro-
posed by other WTO Members).
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nition an informal process. 2 Some of the submissions address this
point. The European Communities emphasize that the oral phase in
the consultation should stimulate real discussion and therefore should
be free of procedural formality and remain confidential.6' Overall, the
European Communities still remain of the opinion that consultations
should remain as informal as possible. Switzerland reportedly states
the consultations should be as flexible as possible. Guatemala is said
to consider the consultations to be already too formalistic.
A warning also should be directed at proposals that refer to a sec-
ond function of the DSU consultations. The second function would
be fact-finding. Some people see this as an additional function when
a mutually satisfactory solution, the first function, cannot be reached.
This fact-finding function is based on a statement of the Appellate
Body in the India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agri-
cultural Chemical Products case:
All parties engaged in dispute settlement under the DSU must be fully
forthcoming from the very beginning both as to the claims involved in a
dispute and as to the facts relating to those claims. Claims must be stated
clearly. Facts must be disclosed freely. This must be so in consultations as
well as in the more formal setting of panel proceedings. In fact, the de-
mands of due process that are implicit in the DSU make this especially
necessary during consultations, for the claims that are made and the facts
that are established during consultations do much to shape the substance
and the scope of subsequent panel proceedings.64
This statement clarifies the consequences of the principles of good
faith and due process for consultations. Consultations conducted in
good faith will result in a clarification of the facts and legal claims at
issue, and will be important in shaping the case put before the panel.
The Appellate Body, however, does not elevate fact-finding to a
separate function, nor is fact-finding identified as a separate function
for consultations in the DSU. Strengthening the role of fact-finding
in the consultation phase might contribute to increased effectiveness
62. See DSU, supra note 4, art. 5.
63. DSU, supra note 4, art. 4.6.
64. See Report of the Appellate Body on India-Patent Protection for Pharma-
ceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, Dec. 19, 1997, WVTO Doc.
WT/DS50/AB/R, para. 94 [hereinafter Patent Protection].
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of the consultations phase. Making it a separate function is likely to
change the nature of consultations and is contrary to the spirit of the
DSU.65
D. PANELS
1. Composition
As with all adjudicative procedures in contemporary public inter-
national law, the panel procedure is rooted in arbitral practice where
it is usual that parties themselves control the procedure and deter-
mine who will adjudicate the dispute.66 As stated in the 1907 Hague
Convention, "International arbitration has for its object the settle-
ment of disputes between States by Judges of their own choice. 7
Similarly, the DSU leaves the composition of panels to the parties.68
The Secretariat can make suggestions, but it is the parties that have
to agree on the identity of the panelists within twenty days after the
establishment of the panel.69 In practice, this has proven to be a diffi-
cult issue because the parties' views diverge as to what makes a good
panelist. The first difficulty arises from the fact that WTO Members
distinguish two types of panelists on the basis of their background
and qualifications. The first type of panelists are government offi-
65. Note that where fact-finding was meant to be a distinct function in WTO
Agreements, this is mentioned expressis verbis. See Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, Apr. 14, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IA, art. 12, para. 5, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 229
("The purpose of the consultations shall be to clarify the facts of the situation and
to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution.").
66. See generally R.P. ANAND, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND CONTEMPORARY
CONFLICTS 67-97 (1974) (discussing various methods of dispute settlement); J.L.
SIMPSON & HAZEL Fox, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW & PRACTICE 42-43
(1959) (explaining, for example, that the agreement to arbitrate should include the
names of persons to comprise the tribunals; or describe the way they are ap-
pointed).
67. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 18,
1907, art. 37, 36 Stat. 2199, 2220, 1 Bevans 557, 591 (emphasis added).
68. See DSU, supra note 4, art. 8.6 (allowing the parties to the dispute to op-
pose the composition of the panel only for "compelling reasons").
69. See id. art. 8.7 (setting forth the procedure for establishing a panel if the
parties cannot agree to its composition).
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cials, especially Geneva-based diplomats, while the second type are
practitioners or academics. WTO Members tend to favor one or the
other.
A second difficulty in agreeing on prospective panelists is the na-
tionality issue. Article 8.3 of the DSU excludes nationals of parties
and third parties from becoming panelists. " This is a classic rule in
arbitral practice that derives from the belief that nationals can never
be wholly impartial.7' WTO practice, however, has employed a very
extensive interpretation of the nationality concept that encompasses
the nationals of all WTO Members within a given trade block-e.g.,
all nationalities in the European Communities. This practice does not
promote the selection of the most qualified panelists as it often
leaves rather few possibilities, especially in multiparty complaints."
If parties cannot agree on the identity of all the panelists within the
time limit, then the Director-General nominates the members of the
panel. 3
The problem of composition of arbitral tribunals exists in arbitra-
tion, as well. Specific solutions are used when no agreement can be
reached on the identity of the arbitrators. The solutions all reduce the
control of the parties to some degree. Often used is the amiable com-
position, whereby the parties choose one arbitrator and these arbi-
trators decide on a president of the arbitral tribunal. Thus, the prob-
lem of reaching agreement on the composition of the arbitral tribunal
is avoided and the problem is shifted from the parties to the arbitra-
tors. It has been observed, however, that states always show a special
confidence in the arbitrator of their choice.' The only arbitral tribu-
nal that could thus be impartial and be perceived by the parties as
impartial is a tribunal that is chosen as a whole body by all parties or
70. Unless the parties agree otherwise. See DSU, supra, note 4, art. 8.3.
71. See ANAND, supra note 66, at 22-27, 98-193.
72. See Steger, supra note 16 (noting that this leaves mainly panelists from
New Zealand and Switzerland on the limited list of possibilities); Bernhard Jansen,
Free World Trade and the European Union-The Reconciliation of Interests and the
Revision of Dispute Resolution Procedures in the Framework of the World Trade
Organisation (1998) (adding Australia and some Latin American countries to the
limited list of possibilities).
73. See DSU, supra note 4, art. 8.7.
74. See ANAND, supra note 66, at 142.
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where the arbitrators are chosen by a third party.75 Diminishing con-
trol of the parties over the arbitral procedure, however, has not been
acceptable to states.76
The DSU procedure is different from arbitral procedure because
the WTO Members have accepted that the continuance of the process
does not depend on the consent of the parties." The parties do not
control the procedure. The procedure is automatic, the choice of pan-
elists by the parties to the dispute only leads to delays and confirms
the idea of panelists linked to parties rather than appearing wholly
impartial in fact and in appearance. The European Communities pro-
posal severs the ties with the arbitral practice by introducing a
standing Panel Body. A detailed description of the Panel Body is
given in the proposal:
This body could consist of between 15 and 24 members. The membership
would be of high quality and be representative in terms of geography, but
members would be independent. They would serve for a fixed period. A
clear majority of them should have a background in international trade
law; some could be selected based on their broad experience in WTO
matters, others (also) for their particular sectoral experience. On the basis
of a rotation mechanism, this Panel Body would itself form a chamber of
three to deal with each new case as it arises .... 78
Although the idea of a fixed pool of panelists is also found in other
proposals, only the European Communities expressly propose that
the composition should no longer be in the hands of the parties.
Other proposals only stress the need of discussing this point because
the current system and the bias of some parties toward some types of
panelist causes delays and frustrates the objectives of the DSU in en-
suring the expertise, independence and integrity of a panel.
If WTO Members were to find it unacceptable to loose control
over the composition of the panel, one alternative is the ad hoc
75. See id. at 138-43.
76. See Draft on Arbitral Procedure, Report by Georges Scelle, Special Rap-
porteur, International Law Commission, 10th Sess., UN Doc. A/CN.4/113 (1958)
[hereinafter ILC Draft Arbitration Code]; ANAND, supra note 66, at 143-45.
77. See ILC Draft Arbitration Code, supra note 76 (proposing the same princi-
ple, known as the principle of non-frustration).
78. See EC Discussion Paper, supra note 60.
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chamber procedure of the International Court of Justice.' This pro-
cedure allows for a composition of chambers that takes into account
the views of the parties. Their views largely determine the composi-
tion of the chamber. The official decision, however, is ultimately
taken by the Court.80
2. Procedural Adjustments
Panel proceedings are instituted when a complainant requests the
establishment of a panel. Article 6.2 of the DSU states that the writ-
ten request "shall [...] identify the specific measures at issue, and
provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaints suffi-
cient to present the problem clearly."'" The Appellate Body holds to
the legitimacy of the minimum standard interpretation of Article 6.2,
whereby it is sufficient for the complaining parties to list the provi-
sions of the specific agreements that allegedly were violated, without
setting out detailed arguments as to which specific aspects of the
measures at issue relate to which specific provisions of those agree-
ments. It is exactly this linkage of disputed facts and legal claims that
some WTO Members propose. This would no doubt increase the
transparency but seems difficult to achieve as the linkage involves
building legal reasoning, something that is done progressively during
the panel procedure. 2 Nevertheless, the legal and factual issues need
to be clearly specified as this will form the basis of the panel's delib-
79. See Dr. Allan Rosas, EC and the WTO Dispute Settlement: Some Reflec-
tions on Practice and Doctrines, Presentation at the 37th Leiden-London Meeting
(June 27, 1998).
80. See Rudolf Ostrihansky, Chambers of the International Court of Justice, 37
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 30, 43 (1988) (noting that the extent of the parties' influence
on the composition is controversial); Lukas H. Meyer, The Ad Hoc Chambers:
Perspectives of the Parties and the Court, 27 ARCHIV DES VOLKERREcwTs 413,
413-41 (1989).
81. DSU, supra note 4, art. 6.2.
82. See WTO Appellate Body Report on EC-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, Sept. 9, 1997, WT/DS27IAB/R, para. 142 [hereinafter
Sale and Distribution of Bananas] (recommending that a panel carefully review the
complaining party's documents that initiate a proceeding); Patent Protection, supra
note 64, para. 95.
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erations. Claims not spelled out at this stage cannot be entertained as
they would not be within the terms of reference.8"
This issue of determining the actual facts and claims in the request
for the establishment of a panel would be better dealt with in a pre-
liminary phase, where clarification and additional fact-finding could
take place. Apart from several WTO Members, the Appellate Body
also repeatedly requests that the panel be able to deal with such mat-
ters as its jurisdiction and fact-findingY
E. THE APPELLATE BODY
The European Communities also discuss a number of issues, such
as increasing the membership of the Appellate Body and the trans-
parency in the selection of Appellate Body Divisions. Currently, the
Plenary seems to be involved in every case. Therefore, the European
Communities also propose a special role for the Plenary." According
to the suggestion, the Plenary would rule on cases that the Appellate
Body considers sufficiently important. This decision could be made
by the President of the Appellate Body or by a Division. The Presi-
dent or the Division could consider the importance of the case pro-
prio motu or at the request of a party.
Several submissions raise an issue that relates to the possibility of
conferring remand authority on the Appellate Body. The issue con-
cerns the problem faced by the Appellate Body when a new decision
on the facts is required because the Appellate Body decision is based
on a different interpretation of the law, or on the basis of a different
legal reasoning than that of the panel, or on procedural mistakes."" In
such cases, it would be appropriate to send the case back to the origi-
nal panel rather than having the Appellate Body decide on the basis
of the facts described in the panel report, facts that may not be ade-
quately described in the light of the new legal reasoning. Panels do
83. See Patent Protection, supra note 64, paras. 85-96.
84. See Sale and Distribution of Bananas, supra note 82, para. 144 (noting that
panels should be allowed to make preliminary determinations based upon the ini-
tial written submissions of the parties to a dispute); Patent Protection, supra note
64, para. 95.
85. See EC Discussion Paper, supra note 60; Jansen, supra note 72.
86. See David Palmeter, The WTO Appellate Body Needs Remand Authority, 32
J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1998, at 41, 41-44.
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not deal with all legal claims, nor do they exhaustively investigate all
possibilities of legal reasoning. The principle of judicial economy, as
applied by the panels, results in reports that only address claims and
issues only as far as necessary to reach a decision. According to the
current DSU procedure, the Appellate Body must either decide itself
without real legal basis for this authority or send the case to the DSB,
which could establish a new panel. The Appellate Body has never
sent a case back to the DSB. This raises questions about the role of
the panels when the Appellate Body substitutes the panel decision
with a de novo decision of its own. Is the panel stage then merely
preparatory before the adjudication by the Appellate Body? Is it,
moreover, equitable that parties can only benefit from an appeal
when the decision is taken by a panel and not when the decision is
taken by the Appellate Body, even though its decision was de novo?
CONCLUSION
It would be premature to draw any conclusions from the current
debate. The proposals may be numerous, but they only constitute the
views of a minority of the WTO Membership that may or may not
represent the general view. Moreover, it is quite possible that new is-
sues will appear in the near future in cases currently before WTO
Panels or the Appellate Body. As the proposals of the WTO Mem-
bers vary widely and only a few issues return in many proposals, it
will take until the end of the Review before any clarity as to the
likely changes can be expected.
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